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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ASEXUALIZATION LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Notwithstanding the fact that some twenty-three states
have at sometime or other passed asexualization laws requiring
or authorizing the sexual sterilization of cacogenic or alleged
cacogenic persons,2 legislation of this type can hardly be called
popular. Much of the antipathy against laws of this sort is
undoubtedly due to religious opposition to birth control for any
purpose and much of it is due to revulsion at mutilation of
the bodies of helpless persons whether committed as revenge or
punishment or with cold calculation of benefits to be derived
therefrom by society. As a matter of fact, the more scientific the
purpose, the more it acquires the stigma of vivisection.
Then too eugenical legislation has suffered from the advocacy
of some of its friends. The eagerness of the scientist to demon-
strate the practical value of his studies has led many advocates
of eugenic legislation to stress its worth to taxpayers in dollars
and cents, rather than the human considerations which popular
feeling always associates with legislation dealing with the un-
fortunate.
'California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia.
Washington and Wisconsin.
"'A cacogenic person is a potential parent whose hereditary nature is
such that the immediate offspring, or the descendant family stock of such
person, would, because of inadequate or defective inheritance from such
person, be represented, in abnormally great percentage, by individuals who,
under normal environment of the State, would fail to function as socially
adequate persons." Section 3 of Text of Proposed Sterilization Law
"Eugenical Sterilization, 1926," H. H. Laughlin. Dr. Harry H. Laughlin is
Eugenics Associate of the Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Court
of Chicago, and Eugenics Director of Carnegie Institution of Washington,
Cold Spring Harbor, N. Y. His "Eugenical Sterilization in the United
States (1922)" and his "Eugenical Sterilization (1926)" contain a great many
statistics and documents relative to the subject not elsewhere obtainable.
Dr. Laughlin was the state's expert in the case of Buck 7. Bell (see note
13 infra).
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"Eugenics," says Professor Irving Fisher, "stands against
the forces which work for racial deterioration, and for improve-
ment and vigor, intelligence and moral fiber of the human race.
It represents the highest form of patriotism and humanitarianism,
while at the same time it offers immediate advantages to ourselves
and to our children. By eugenic measures, for instance, our
burden of taxes can be reduced by decreasing the number of
degenerates, delinquents and defectives supported in public in-
stitutions; such measures will also increase safeguards against
crimes committed against our persons or our property." 3
This type of argument has an appeal to the general public
inversely to its appeal to chambers of commerce and real estate
boards. Notwithstanding the efforts of economists and would-
be economists, the general public is not convinced that it pays
taxes, and on the basis of argument like Professor Fisher's,
asexualization looks like a heartless method on the part of the
tax-paying classes of getting rid of the duty of caring for the
helpless and, unfortunate of the poorer strata of society-those
classes who cannot keep their idiots, imbeciles, epileptics and in-
sane at home.
Other factors too have worked to impede the spread of this
type of legislation. One is an uncomfortable feeling on the part
of laymen that the scientific proponents of asexualization are
rather obscenely eager in their propaganda, especially since the
general public is not yet familiar with the results of scientific
investigation in the field of heredity. Another is the fact that
much of the proposed legislation has not even the pretence of
scientific purpose but is frankly punitive, a third is the admitted
fact that the factor of heredity in criminality is not yet known
with any degree of certainty, a fourth is a popular distrust of
scientists who, not content with announcing the results of their
investigations, seek to actively influence legislation to impose their
theories on the community, a fifth is the fact that the general
public knows of only one method of sterilizing males, castration,
and knows of it primarily as a bestial preliminary to lynching.
As a result we have had a series of gubernatorial vetoes,
and decisions holding asexualization laws unconstitutional, many
'Quoted in introduction to H. H. Laughlin, "Eugenical Sterilization in
the United States (1922), by Chief Justice Harry Olson, of Municipal
Court of Chicago.
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of them giving cogent legal reasons in support of the position
adopted, but all of them betraying dread and repulsion, and a
dislike not only of the legislation proposed or passed, but of the
proponents of it.
The first asexualization bill in the United States was passed
in Pennsylvania in March, 1905. It was promptly vetoed by
Governor Pennypacker in a message reflecting clearly popular
objection to the meddling of scientists with public affairs. He
wrote in part :'
"* * * The subject of the act is not the prevention of
idiocy, but it is to provide that in every institution in the
state, entrusted with the care of idiots and imbecile chil-
dren, a neurologist, a surgeon and a physician shall be
authorized to perform an operation upon the inmates
'for the prevention of procreation.' What is the nature
of the operation is not described but it is such an opera-
tion as they shall decide to be 'safest and most effective.'
It is plain that the safest and most effective method of
preventing procreation would be to cut the heads off the
inmates, and such authority is given by the bill to this
staff of scientific experts. It is not probable that they
would resort to this means for the prevention of procre-
ation, but it is probable that they would endeavor to de-
stroy some part of the human organism. Scientists like all
other men whose experiences have been limited to one
pursuit, and whose minds have been developed in a par-
ticular direction, sometimes need to be restrained. Men
of high scientific attainments are prone, in their love for
technique, to lose sight of broad principles outside of
their domain of thought. A surgeon may possibly be so
eager to advance in skill as to be forgetful of the danger
to his patient. Anatomists may be willing to gather infor-
mation by the infliction of pain and suffering upon helpless
creatures, although a higher standard of conduct would teach
them that it is far better for humanity to bear its own ills
than to escape them by knowledge only secured through
cruelty to other creatures. This bill whatever good might
possibly result from it if its provisions should become a law,
violates the principles of ethics. These feeble-minded and
'Veto Message, March 30, 1905, Senate bill 35, passed March 21, 1905,
Gov. S. W. Pennypacker, Pennsylvania, contained in Laughlin, supra, note
3 at 35, 36.
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imbecile children have been entrusted to the institutions by
their parents and guardians for the purpose of training
and 'instruction. It is proposed to experiment upon them,
not for their instruction, but in order to help society in the
future. It is to be done without their consent, which they
cannot give and without the consent of their parents,
or guardians, who are responsible for their welfare. It
would be in contravention of the laws which have been
enacted for the establishment of these institutions. These
laws have in contemplation the training and the instruc-
tion of the children. This bill assumes that they cannot
be so instructed and trained. Moreover, the course it is
proposed to pursue would have a tendency to prevent such
training and instruction. Every one knows, whether he
be a scientist or an ordinary observer, that to destr6y
virility is to lessen the capacity, the energy and the spirit
which lead to effort. The bill is, furthermore illogical in
thought. Idiocy, will not be prevented by the prevention of
procreation among these inmates. This mental condition is
due to causes many of which are entirely beyond our
knowledge. It existed long before there were ever such
inmates of such institutions. * * * To permit such an
operation would be to inflict cruelty upon a helpless class
in the community which the state has undertaken to pro-
tect * * V"
This is typical of the non-legal objections directed to legisla-
tion of this type. Other grounds given for similar vetoes are:
that it is difficult from the phrasing of some of the laws proposed
or passed, to judge whether habitual criminals were to be sterilized
because their habitual criminality was considered a sign of mental
unsoundness or merely because of the fact that they were habitual
criminals; 5 that the decision of a board should not be final when
individuals are to be deprived of God-given powers, functions and
rights; 6 that legislation so far reaching in its consequences and so
imminently related to the social life of mankind should not be taken
thoughtlessly or heedlessly since it was a type of legislation new
'Veto Message, Feb. 22, 1909, Senate bill 68, passed Feb. 17, 1909,
Gov. G. E. Chamberlain, Oregon, contained in Laughlin, supra, note 3 at
40, 41.
Opinion of Attorney General R. E. Brown on which Senate bill 79,
passed Jan. 21, 1913, was vetoed by Gov. Fletcher, Vermont, Jan. 31, 1913,
contained in Laughlin, supra, note 3 at 45, 46.
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and practically untried and more in keeping with the pagan age
than with the teachings of Christianity;' that laws providing for
the sterilization of criminals and insane, while adopted in some
jurisdictions and enforced in one or two states, are a dead letter in
most of them and that the scientific premises upon which these laws
are based are still too much in the realm of controversy and still
too experimental to justify this type of legislation. 8
It is apparent that a great many of the motives which pre-
vented the approval of such asexualization laws as were proposed,
were what might be termed moral and ethical rather than strictly
legal. Most of these laws fared no better after approval when
litigated in the courts of various jurisdictions, although naturally
the opposition to these laws as shown by the courts was on 'the
basis of their unconstitutionality from various points of view.
There is nevertheless, evident in most of these decisions the same
repulsion and dislike on moral and ethical grounds. Where steril-
ization is ordered as a punitive measure, the ethical consideration
is merged in the constitutional objection of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. One court holding such a law unconstitutional on the
ground that it denies to the proposed subject of the operation equal
protection of the laws, expressed the fear that such legislation
might be extended to include those who suffered from certain
contagious diseases, or any persons who, in the opinion of the
majority of a prevailing legislature, might be considered undesir-
able citizens, citing as an example racial differences which might
afford a basis for such an opinion in communities where that ques-
tion is unfortunately a permanent and paramount issue.9  Another
asked,
"Must the marriage relation be based and enforced by
statute according to the teachings of the farmer in selecting
his male animals to be mated with certain female animals
only ?"
'Veto Message, Apr. 14, 1913, Senate bill 132, passed Apr. 8, 1913,
Gov. J. H. Morehead, Nebraska, contained in Laughlin, supra, note 3 at
47, 48.
'Veto Message, Mar. 19, 1919, Senate bill 150, passed Mar. 6, 1919,
Gov. D. R. Davis, Idaho, contained in Laughlin supra, note 3 at 50.
'Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N. J. Law 46, 88 Atl. 963 (1913).
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-and declared the law unconstitutional on. the grounds that it
was a bill of attainder and inflicted cruel and unusual punish-
ment.10
Another decision which based its declaration of unconstitu-
tionality on the ground that the proposed subject of the operation
was denied the equal protection of the laws, cites a biologist who
testified at the trial to the effect that included within the class of
defective persons are to be found the most gifted as well as the
most vicious, giving such instances as Chatterton, Goldsmith,
Coleridge and Charles Lang. The court referred to the law as
inhuman, and went so far as to state that there is to be found
much of good in the most degenerate families, even the Jukes and
the Nams."L
One court states franky that it is a notorious fact that many
justices do not regard mutilation as a wise or lawful method of
punishment and classed the operation of vasectomy with branding;
the amputation of a finger, the slitting of a tongue or the cutting
off of an ear.1 2  On the ten occasions in which various state
statutes were passed upon by highest court to which they were
carried, only three were held by such courts to be constitu-
tional. 3 The others on various grounds refused to uphold the
validity of the laws.' 4
"Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413, 416, 417 (D. C. S. D., Iowa E. D. 1914).
"Osborne v. Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N. Y. Supp. 638 aff'd. 171
N. Y. Supp. 1094 (3rd Dept. 1918).
" Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. C. D. Nev. 1918).
'"State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1909); Smith v. Wayne
Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925) ; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va.
310, 130 So. 516 (1925), this case was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court, May 2, 1927, U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. 1, 1926, 292. This is the second
case on legislation of this kind to go up to the Supreme Court but the
first to be decided on the merits. Davis v. Berry, supra, note 10, was
appealed and judgment of the district court was reversed because in the
meantime the state of Iowa had repealed the statute which the district
court had declared unconstitutional. 242 U. S. 468 (1917).
"Smith v. Board of Examiners, supra, note 9; Osborne v. Thomson,
supra, note 11; Haynes v. Williams, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N. W. 938 (1918);
Davis v. Berry, supra, note 10, 13; Mickle v. Henrichs, supra, note 12;
Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N. E. 2 (1921); State Board of
Eugenics v. Jacob Cline, cited in Laughlin, supra, note 3. The decision of
the Circuit Court of Oregon for the County of Marion, Department No.
1, No. 15442, is not officially reported.
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This article has so far made no distinction between those stat-
utes which were eugenic in their purpose and those which were
frankly punitive or those in which the motives were both eugenic
and punitive. The undercurrent of objection on moral and ethical
grounds is strong in most of the decisions whether the statute
construed belonged to one classification or the other.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Buck v. Bell,15 is bound, however, to effect a change
in the judicial as well as the popular attitude to this type of legisla-
tion. This is due largely to the fact that the opinion was written
by Mr. Justice Holmes. Judge Holmes is recognized as a jurist
whose social and political philosophy is essentially humane and
who recognizes the fact that in constitutional questions the
decision of a court is influenced largely by the court's social and
political philosophy. An opinion by him finding an asexualization
law constitutional will inevitably cause a re-examination of the
subject not only from the point of view of the legal questions
involved but also with a view of re-evaluating the basis of the non-
legal objections directed to all such legislation. He states: 11
"We have seen more than once that the public welfare
may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often niot
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence, It is better fof all the
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind."
It is evident that the nori-legal objections generally urged
against asexualization for any reason is based on an ill-con-
sidered sentimentality which fails to properly consider the good
of the very clags of human beings whom these statutes affect.
It must be kept in mind that the Virginia statute which
was passed upon by the Supreme Court affects only inmates
of state institutions for the insane, feeble minded or epileptic who
are inflicted with hereditary recurrent insanity, idiocy, feeble minded-
ness or epilepsy and who after sterilization could be paroled or
" Supra, note 13.
"Buck v. Bell supra, note 13.
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discharged and could become self-supporting."" It is in no sense
punitive and does not affect criminals of any kind, as criminals.
An operation whose sole effect would be the prevention of pro-
creation and which in no way affects the emotional or mental
capacity of the subject could not in the case of the mentally de-
fective be held inhuman, and as pointed out by Judge Holmes, it
often would not be felt to be a sacrifice by those upon whom the
operation is performed. Certainly nothing that tends to diminish the
number of those who in their degeneracy and helplessness con-
tinually run afoul of the law or suffer want because of the
incapacity of self-support could be inhuman, provided, of course,
that those upon whom the operation is performed are not brutally
mutilated. If we consider the objections of the tender-minded as
answered by Mr. Justice Holmes, there only remains to be con-
sidered the question as to what must be included in the provisions
of an asexualization law to make it conform to the Constitution
of the United States and the constitutions of the various states.
Here it is important to discriminate between such statutes as
call for the sterilization of the mentally incompetent as a eugenic
measure and those which call for the sterilization of criminals as
a punitive measure. The considerations involved in passing on the
laws requiring or authorizing the sterilization of these classes differ
in that those statutes which permit or command sterilization of
criminals as punishment irivolve the consideration of whether or
not sterilization constittte4 cruel and unusual punishment, and
whqther such a statute is a bill of attainder or an ex post facto
law. These cannot be questions in those cases which involve
the sterilization of the mentally unfit since with regard to this
class the element of punishment is absent.' 9 We will take up
these questions first.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
Of all the states which have passed sterilization laws, only in
Washington has a sterilization law frankly punitive in its purpose
been held cotistitutional. In the case of State v. Feilen,2" the
"Va. Laws 1924, ch. 394, p. 569 [S. B. 281].
" Osborne v. Thomson, supra, note 11. Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge,
supra, note 13.
" Supra, note 13.
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defendant was convicted of the crime of statutory rape upon a
female person under the age of ten years and was sentenced to a
period of not less than five years in the state prison, and the
sentence further ordered that 21
"An operation to be performed upon said Peter Feilen
for the prevention of procreation, and the warden of the
penitentiary of the state of Washington is hereby directejl
to have this order carried into effect at the said peniten-
tiary by some qualified and capable surgeon by the operation
known as vasectomy; said operation to be carefully and
scientifically performed."
This punishment is authorized by the Washington statute,22
which provides:
"Whenever any person shall be adjudged guilty of
carnal abuse of a female person under the age of ten years.
or of rape, or shall be adjudged to be a habitual criminal,
the court may, in addition to such other punishment or con-
finement as may be imposed, direct an operation to be per-
formed upon such person, for the prevention of pro-
creation."
The Washington constitution,2 3 has the customary provision
that:
"Excessive bail should not be required, excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted."
The statute does not provide for any particular type of opera-
tion for the prevention of procreation and the trial judge ordered
that the operation known as vasectomy be carefully and skillfully
performed. The question then presented for the consideration of
the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was whether the
operation of vasectomy carefully and skillfully performed must be
judicially declared cruel punishment forbidden by the constitution.
The court cited from an article by Dr. Clark Bell 24 which quoted
the following language from an article by Judge Warren W. Foster
-Ibid., 66, 76.
'Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington, 1922) sec. 2287, Wash. Laws 1909,
ch. 249, sec. 35.
" Art. 1, sec. 14.
" 27 Medico-Legal Jour. 134.
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-of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace of the County of
New York,25 as follows :21
"Vasectomy is known to the medical profession as 'an
office operation' painlessly performed in a few minutes, un-
der an anaesthetic (cocaine) through a skin cut half an inch
long, and entailing no wound infection, no confinement to
bed. It is less serious than the 'extraction of a tooth' to
quote from Dr. William D. Belfield, of Chicago, one of the
pioneers of the movement for the sterilization of criminals
by vasectomy, an opinion that finds ample corroboration
among practitioners * * * Dr Sharp has this to say of this
method of relief to society: 'Vasectomy c6nsists of ligating
and resecting a small portion of the vas deferens. This
operation is indeed very simple and easy to perform; I do.
it without administering an anaesthetic, either general or
local. It requires about three minutes' time to perform the
operation and the subject returns to his work immediately,
suffers no inconvenience, and is in no way impaired for his
pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness, but is effectively
sterilized."
On the basis of this expert opinion the court found that vas-
ectomy is not such a cruel punishment as cannot be inflicted. This
decision runs counter to the general opinion of the courts who were
called upon to pass on the operation as a punitive measure.
In the case of Mickle v. Henrichs,2 1 the defendant was con-
victed of the crime of rape and was sentenced to an indeterminate
period of not less than five years in the Nevada Penitentiary and
and was further sentenced to have an operation performed upon
his person and body to prevent procreation. The Nevada statute,"
was copied after the similar statute of the state of Washington
and the sentence ordering the defendant to be sterilized was based
on the authority of that statute.
On appeal, the statute was held unconstitutional. The court
after citing the opinion of Davis v. Bery, 2  went on to say:3"
Pearson's Mag. Nov., 1909.
= Supra, note 13, at 69, 77.
= Supra, note 12.
SCrimes and Punishment Act, sec. 28, Nev. Rev. Laws (1912) sec.
6293. The Nevada Law, however, in addition provides that the operation
shall not consist of castration.
' Supra, note 10.
' Supra, note 12 at 690.
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"Vasectomy in itself is not cruel; it is no more cruel
than branding, the amputation of a finger, the slitting of a
tongue, or the cutting off of an ear; but when resorted to
as a punishment, it is ignominious and degrading, and in
that sense it is cruel. Certainly it would be unusual in
Nevada."
The court in its decision in attempting to explain why it
construed a statute similar to the Washington statute differently
from the construction placed on it by the Washington Supreme
Court drew a distinction between the Washington constitution and
the constitution of Nevada. The Washington constitution forbids
"cruel punishment,-the Nevada constitution forbids 'cruel or un-
usual punishments.' ,,'
The distinction seems to be due to the usual disinclination
of courts to openly disagree with each other. The court's dis-
cussion shows clearly that the basis of its objection to the
statute was the cruelty of the provision rather than its un-
usualness.
In the nature of things there cannot be a clear definition as
to what constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. The classifica-
tion is purely relative, and what constitutes cruelty at one time
and place is not necessarily cruelty absolutely. The Nevada
court in defining the word "unusual," cited Hobbs v. The State,3 2
to the effect that "unusual" as used in the Constitution, means a
class of punishments which never existed in the State, or that class
which public sentiment regarded as having condemned.
Just when castration was first authorized in England is not
known, but it was a recognized penalty for rape in Anglo-Saxon
England and in the reign of Henry II secular clergymen guilty of
treason in bringing over any mandate from the Pope or any one in
authority in church affairs were punishable by loss of their eyes
and by castration."3
The opinion in Whitten v. George,3 4 lists castration with
'Supra, note 22 and Nevada Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 6.
"133 Ind. 404, 32 N.E. 1019 (1893).
'Davis v. Berry, supra, note 10. Smith v. Wayne, Probate Judge,
supra, note 13.
1447 Ga. 298 (1872).
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punishments of former days, as does the opinion of Weems v.
U. S.33
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States forbidding cruel and unusual punishment was taken from
the Bill of Rights framed at the Revolution of 1688,36 and it is
certain that castration was never inflicted after the Revolution of
1688.37
Blackstone lists methods of punishment common in England,
as follows :38
"Of these some are capital, which extend to the life of
the offender, and consist generally in being hanged by the
neck till dead; though in very atrocious crimes, other cir-
cumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace are superadded; as,
in treasons of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the
place of execution; in high treason, affecting the King's
person or Government, emboweling alive, beheading, and
quartering; and in murder a public dissection. And, in
cases of any treason committed by a female, the judgment
is to be burned alive. But the humanity of the English
nation has authorized, by a tacit consent, an almost general
mitigation of such parts of these judgments as savor of
terror or cruelty; a sledge or hurdle being usually allowed
to such traitors as are condemned to be drawn; and there
being very few instances (and those accidental or by negli-
gence) of any person's being emboweled or burned until
previously deprived of sensation by strangling. * * * Some,
though rarely, occasioned a mutilation or dismembering, by
cutting off the hands or ears; others fix a lasting stigma on
the offender by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the
hand or cheek."
In the Feilen case the Court cites with approval the case to
State v. Woodward,39 to the effect that to define cruel and unusual
punishment one must go back to those with which the authors of
the constitutional provision were familiar, and refers to the punish-
ments mentioned by Blackstone. The weakness of this reasoning
1?217 U. S. 349 (1910) 54 L. Ed. 793.
'2 Story, Constitution (4th Ed. 1873) sec. 1903.
'Davis v. Berry, supra, note 10.
- 4 B1. Comm. * 376, 377.
" 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385 (1910).
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lies in the fact that some punishments are so horrible that they
had long been obsolete even in Blackstone's day. One cannot argue
that because crucifixion had ceased to be inflicted eighteen cen-
turies before the days of the authors of the Eighth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution and similar provisions in state consti-
tutions, and was no longer considered possible in a civilized coun-
try, that it was not included in the prohibition of that amendment.
Further, the amendment should not be limited so as to prohibit in
only those recognized as cruel and unusual at any one period.
Time may serve to enlighten the minds of men to an extent which
will render some of our most approved forms of punishment
odious, and the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment and similar
provisions in the various State constitutions may then well apply
to such punishments. It is doubtful if a statute restoring the
penalty of death by hanging in those States which had substituted
electrocution would be upheld.
In Weems v. United States, 40 the Court said:
"Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations says that it
may be well doubted if the right exist 'to establish the whip-
ping post and the pillory in those States where they were
never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in those
States whose constitutions, revised since public opinion had
banished them, have forbidden cruel and unusual punish-
ments.' The clause of the Constitution in the opinion of the
learned commentators may be therefore progressive, and is
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."
The argument that vasectomy because of its painlessness and
simplicity cannot be held to be cruel narrows cruelty down to
physical cruelty only. Even in times less enlightened than the
present the element of mental suffering in punishment was recog-
nized, and Blackstone points out that in punishment for treason
the bodies of women were not exposed and mutilated after the
culprit's death, as was true with those of men.41
In the case of Berry v. Davis the court said :42
"' Supra, note 35 at 378.
" 4 BI. Comm.* 93.
" Supra, note 10 at 417.
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"No one can doubt but that under our present civiliza-
tion if castration were to be adopted as a mode of punish-
ment for any crime, all minds would so revolt that all courts
without hesitation would declare it to be a cruel and unusual
punishment. * * * While it is true that there are differences
between the two operations of castration and vasectomy, and
while it is true that the effect upon the man would be dif-
ferent in several respects, yet the fact remains that the pur-
pose and the same shame and humiliation and degradation
and mental torture are the same in one case as in the other.
And our conclusion is that the infliction of this penalty is
in violation of the Constitution, which provides that cruel
and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted."
The movement to add sterilization to the list of punishments
for crime common in the United States has made no headway.
On the contrary, the tendency has been to condemn punitive
asexualization as repugnant to our institutions.
43
BILL OF ATTAINDER AND Ex POST FAcTO LAWS
The question whether a sterilization law as a punitive meas-
ure is cruel and unusual punishment or whether as a eugenic
measure it gives the proposed subject due process of law, or
denies him the equal protection of the laws, is inherent in the
nature of this novel type of legislation, but the fact that provisions
in certain punitive asexualization laws may constitute them bills
of attainder, or ex post facto laws is merely accidental.
Due to the limited space allotted to the discussion of this sub-
ject and its consequent limited scope this article cannot deal with
every type of objection which may be directed against a specific
statute, but must confine itself to such questions as inevitably arise
in connection with asexualization in general.
Only one sterilization law was specifically held to be a bill of
attainder. In Davis v. Berry the court held that the Iowa statute
came within the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder
in that it provided that when it appeared that a convict had
twice been convicted of a felony, the State Board of Parole with
the managing officer and surgeon of each institution were imme-
diately required to sterilize him. The court said:4'
"Supra, note 2.
" Supra, note 10 at 419.
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"But assuming that the prior convictions all appear of
record, and assuming there is no conflict in the testimony
and no difficulty in reaching the conclusion, but little or no
advance is made in determining the question. If it be said
that the statute automatically decides the question and noth-
ing remains for the prison physician to do but to execute
that which is already of record then the statute becomes
a Bill of Attainder. One of the rights of every man of
sound mind is to enter into the marriage relation. Such is
one of his civil rights, and deprivation or suspension of any
civil right for past conduct is punishment for such conduct,
and this fulfills the definition of a Bill of Attainder, because
a Bill of Attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punish-
ment without a jury trial, as is fully discussed in the case
of Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. 277, The Federalist,
No. 44 by Madison, Justice Samuel F. Miller on the Con-
stitution 584; Watson on the Constitution, 733-738."
American courts are so unfamiliar with bills of attainder that
considerable confusion exists as to their nature.45 Judge Story's
summary is still the best analysis of the subject in American legal
literature. He says :4'
"Bills of Attainder, as they are technically called, are
such special acts of the legislature as inflict capital punish-
ments upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offences,
such as treason and felony, without any conviction in the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If an act inflicts
a milder degree of punishment than death, it is called a bill
of pains and penalties. But in the sense of the Constitu-
tion, it seems that bills of attainder include bills of pains
and penalties; for the Supreme Court has said, 'A bill of
attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may con-
fiscate his property or both.' In such case, the legislature
assumes judicial magistracy, pronouncing upon the guilt of
the party without any of the common forms and guards of
trial, and satisfying itself with proofs, when such proofs
are within its reach, whether they are conformable to the
rules of evidence, or not. In short, in all such cases, the
legislature exercises the highest power of sovereignty, and
what may be properly deemed an irresponsible despotic dis-
'Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall (U. S.) 333, dissenting opinion of Miller
J., at 386 (1866).
"2 Story, Constitution (5th Ed. 1891) sec. 1344.
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cretion, being governed solely by what it deems political
necessity or expediency, and too often under the influence
of unreasonable fears, or unfounded suspicions. -* * : The
punishment has often been inflicted without calling upon the
party accused to answer, or without even the formality of
proof; and sometimes, because the law, in its ordinary
course of proceedings, would acquit the offender."
Under this construction of bills of attainder the Iowa statute
cannot be said to be one. The convictions for felony were had by
due process of law and the law did not pretend to apply to all
persons who previous to its passage had been twice convicted of
felony. The convict brought himself within the law by a felony
committed after the law took effect and it was an additional penalty
for such offense. It was conceded that the statute was not an ex
post facto law for this reason,4 7 and the same reasoning applies to
the objection that it was a bill of attainder.
The person charged with a felony had to be duly convicted
of such crime and the punishment then applied to him. It was
the court that found the guilt, not the legislature.
The only question left open was the manner of finding the
fact of previous convictions. Where the person charged with the
felony is indicted as a third offender, then of course, the con-
viction settles both his guilt of the third offense and the fact of
the prior convictions. Where the indictment does not so charge
him and he is only found guilty of the felony charged, then
in order to bring him within the statute the prior convictions
4 Davis v. Berry, supra, note 10. See also State of Iowa ex rel, Gregory
V. Jones, 128 Fed. 626 (D. C. S. D. Iowa, W. D. 1904); Kelly v. People,
115 Ill. 583, 4 N E. 644 (1886); Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163,
29 N. E. 579 (1891); In re Miller, 110 Mich. 676, 68 N. W. 990 (1896);
Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio 428, 36 N. E. 18 (1893); Moore v. State of
Missouri, 159 U. S. 673 (1895); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th
Ed. 1903) 382; "And a law is not objectionable as ca" post facto which,
in providing for the punishment of future offences, authorizes the offender's
conduct in the past to be taken into the account, and the punishment to be
graduated accordingly. Heavier penalties are often provided by law for a
second or any subsequent offence than the first; and, it has not been
deemed objectionable that, in providing for such heavier penalties, the
prior conviction authorized to be taken into the account, may have taken
place before the law was passed. In such a case the second or subse-
quent offence is punished, not the first; and the statute would be void if
the offence actually to be punished under it had been committed before it
had taken effect, even tho it was after its passage."
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should be found by due process of law. The Iowa Statute,48
made no provision for a hearing or trial on the question of prior
convictions. It did not give the convict an opportunity to combat
the presumption of the records that he was a second offender.
As the court said: 
9
"The records of two convictions may show the same
nanie of the party or parties convicted; but there are many
men of the same name, but which is no proof that the
person in the one case is the same person convicted in the
other case.
* * * Due process of law means that every person
must have his day in court, and this is as old as Magna
Charta; that sometime in the proceedings he must be con-
fronted by his accuser and given a public hearing."
A bill of attainder implies a lack of due process, but a lack
of due process does not necessarily arise only from a bill of
attainder. The Iowa court seemed to make no distinction. 0
The question of due process is more fully dealt with below.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
The ground on which asexualization laws directed to the sterili-
zation of the mentally incompetent which is most commonly given
as the reason for holding such laws unconstitutional is that they
deny the proposed subject of the operation equal protection of the
laws. In the nature of things the state has actual control only of
the mentally incompetent in its own institutions. With few except-
tions,51 these laws authorize the sterilization only of mentally in-
competent persons confined in state institutions. This naturally
raises the question whether the inmates of state institutions subject
to these laws are denied the equal protection of the laws. The
Supreme Court of the United States in the Buck v. Bell case has
answered this question in the negative, but the majority of
courts to whom this question has been presented, have held that
"Iowa Comp. Code (Supp. 1915) sec. 2600, Iowa Laws, 1913 ch. 189.
" Davis v. Berry, supra, note 10 at 418.
* See Cumming v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 323 (1866); Ex Parte Gar-
land, supra, note 45; Calder v. Bull, 3 DalI. (U. S.) 386 (1798).
' The Washington, Nevada, Maine and Michigan Statutes are among
the few that apply to the population at large equally with the inmates of
state institutions.
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those laws which are limited in their application to inmates of state
institutions deny such inmates the equal protection of the laws.
Such was the position adopted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court to whom this question was first presented and whose well
considered opinion is the basis of most of the decisions followingit.52
The New Jersey statute,5 3 applied only to the feeble minded
epileptic, certain criminals and other defective inmates confined in
the several reformatories, charitable and penal institutions in the
counties and state. The New Jersey Supreme Court's objection
was based upon.54
"* * * the classification upon which the present statute
is based, which is of such a nature that the persons in-
cluded within it are not afforded the equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States, which provides that 'no
State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.' Under this provision it has
been uniformly held that a state statute that bears solely
upon a class of persons selected by it must not only bear
alike upon all the individuals of such class, but that the class
as a whole must bear some reasonable relation to the legis-
lation thus solely affecting the individuals that compose it.
"'It is apparent' said Mr. Justice Brewer in Gulf
Colorado, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ellis (165 U. S. 150) after a
review of many cases, 'that the mere fact of classification
is not sufficient to relieve a statute from the reach of the
equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that in
all cases it must appear, not only that a classification has
been made, but also that it is one based upon some reason-
able ground-some difference which bears a just and proper
relation to the attempted classification-and is not a mere
arbitrary selection.'"
With the criterion set up by Mr. Justice Brewer in mind
the New Jersey Court held that by the classification of incom-
petents into those who are, and those who are not, inmates
" Smith v. Board of Examiners, supra, note 9.
" N. J. Comp. Stat. (1st Supp. 1915) vol. 2, p. 1493, N. J. Laws 1911,
ch. 190.
" Smith v. Board of Examiners, supra, note 9 at 53, 966.
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in public charitable institutions, a principle of selection is adopted
that bears no reasonable relation to the objective sought, the im-
provement of society. The opinion points out that the mental in-
competents who are not confined in institutions subject to the law
vastly outnumber those who are and are much more exposed to
the temptation and opportunity of procreation. The Court went
on to say :
"The particular vice, therefore, of the present classi-
fication is not so much that it creates a sub-classification,
based upon no reasonable basis, as that having thereby
arbitrarily created two classes, it applies the statutory
remedy to that one of those classes to which it has the
least, and in no event a sole application, and to which
indeed, upon the presumption of the proper management
of our public institutions, it has no application at all. When
we consider that such statutory scheme necessarily involves
a suppression of personal liberty and a possible menace to
the life of the individual who must submit to it, it is not
asking too much that an artificial regulation of society that
involves these constitutional rights of some of its members
shall be accomplished, if at all, by a statute that does not
deny to the persons injuriously affected the equal protec-
tion of the laws guaraniteed by the Federal Constitution."
This seems sound law. Assuming that the fear of the opera-
tions of vasectomy or salpingectomy as a menace to the life of the
individual upon whom it is proposed to be performed is exaggerated,
if it serves no practical purpose it is still an abuse of the police
power. Had the court stopped there its opinion would be above
criticism. But it continued with a dictum to the effect that the
suggestion that the classification might be sufficient, if the scheme
of the statute were to 'release the sterilized incompetents is not
deserving of serious consideration.
For it is just this additional provision in the Virginia statute
construed in Buck v. Bell,56 that was suggested by Mr. Justice
Holmes as rendering the objection less valid.
On reading the opinion in the New Jersey case and the United
States Supreme Court case one is impressed by the evident fact
-Ibid., 55, 967.1 cSupra, note 13.
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that both Courts started with their discussions and then wrote their
opinions, and that their decisions were really not dependent on
constitutional arguments advanced. The New Jersey State Supreme
Court after giving a number of illustrations of how the proposed
law could be extended to bring within its provisions temporarily
unpopular groups, or even to check the tendency of the population
to outgrow its means of subsistence in accordance with the Malthu-
sian theory, frankly states :
57
"Evidently the large and underlying question is how
far is government constitutionally justified in the theoreti-
cal betterment of society by means of the surgical steriliza-
tion of certain of its unoffending but undesirable members.
If some, but by no means all of these illustrations are fan-
ciful, they shall serve their purpose of indicating why we
place the deeision of the present case upon a ground that
has no such logical results or untoward consequences.
(Italics ours.)
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States after
showing that the propositus in the case before it was an imbecile,
the daughter of an imbecile and in turn the mother of an imbecile,
says, "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."
The underlying differences between the two opinions are dif-
ferences between their respective attitudes on the relation between
the state and the individual rather than in the differences between
the two statutes construed.
And.yet there is a real difference between the two statutes
which merits attention. Accepting the philosophical basis of the
United States Supreme Court opinion and conceding that the police
power of the state can legitimately be extended to cover asexuali-
zation as it has been extended to cover vaccination, 8 it still remains
true that while the Virginia statute does not violate the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the New
Jersey statute did. Of course as seen from the dictum of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, it was not in" favor of the law in any
form, but had the New Jersey statute been worded in the manner
of the Virginia statute it could not so easilr have been declared
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id., note 54.
"Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).
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The difference is primarily this. The Virginia law provides for
the sterilization only of those incompetents who if sterilized, could
be paroled or discharged and could become self-supporting,"9 the
New Jersey statute merely provided for the sterilization of those
committed to its asylums. This brings us to a consideration of the
extent to which the state in the exercise of its police power can go
in controlling the lives of its citizens. Vaccination physically con-
sists of scarifying the skin and inoculation with a serum. The
aim is to render the subject immune to small-pox and thereby
prevent its spread. Admittedly there is some slight danger that
the subject vaccinated may become infected and there is some slight
pain and discomfort suffered from the operation. No one would
argue that the state may subject its citizens to even slight pain
and discomfort and even a remote chance of infection arbitrarily.
It is when the exercise of its power is for the purpose of achieving
some recognized good and there is a reasonable relation between
the exercise of that power and the good sought, that the police
power, all other things being equal, will be sustained. 60  Further
what is otherwise an injury from which the citizen must be pro-
tected by constitutional safeguards, becomes in relation to the end
achieved a good, and it becomds absurd to talk of safeguards. One
does not need constitutional protection from immunization to small-
pox.
A statute that orders the asexualization of inmates of state
institutions who are committed for life and who cannot be released
because of lack of means to live, or lack of ability for self support
does no good to the subject or to society. In such case it is injury
pure and simple, no matter how slight. It is an abuse of the police
power which by its ,nature is the power of the state to pass laws
for the good and welfare of its citizens.61
But where the statute provides for the selection of those in-
competents who can be self-supporting and for the release of such
incompetents after effective sterilization, then the operation becomes
a benefit and not an injury, both to the subject and to the state.
" Supra, note 18.
' Jacobson v. Massachusetts, supra note 58; People v. Tait, 261 Ill. 197,
103 N. E. 750 (1913); J. T. McMillan Co. v. State Board of Health, 110
Minn. 1215, 124 N. W. 828 (1910); State v. Barberton, 76 Ohio, 297, 81
N. E. 568 (1907) ; Matter of Viemeister, 179 N. Y. 235, 72 N. E. 97 (1904).
m Id.
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The imbecile is benefited by his liberty and by the fact that while
at liberty he is freed from, what to him must be a danger, parent-
hood. By reason of his very mental deficiency he is not deprived
of anything, for if the imbecile were intelligent enough to suffer
from the fact that he is deprived of the power of procreation, he
would be intelligent enough to be out of the class to whom the
statute would apply. Asexualization to a sane criminal causes un-
told mental suffering and humiliation, to an imbecile it means nothing
at all.
Judging it purely from the incompetent's point of view the
power of procreation is not only of no benefit to him, but it is dis-
tinctly detrimental to him. The power of procreation gives him
no joy, it only adds to economic difficulties already great enough.
Something of the same misconception appears in the decision
in Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge 6la which, while upholding the
constitutionality of the new Michigan Gib in the main, declared one
section of it unconstitutional. This section 61C made an exception
in those cases where the adjudged defective as a probable parent
would probably be able to support his children, if any. The court
held that this discriminated against the mental defective of the
poorer classes. As a matter of legislative policy such an excep-
tion may be unwise and may tend to defeat the purpose of the
statute, but it cannot be held to deprive the poorer class of in-
competents of the equal protection of the laws, any more than
a statute requiring the commitment of homeless imbeciles to state
asylums would do so. Sterilization of such individuals is a benefit
conferred on them. It does not deprive them of anything which
to them is of value.
There is food for thought in the fact that most of the laws
providing for the asexualization of the mentally unfit make it a
crime for physicians to sterilize normal persons where the aim is
not therapeutic. 6 2
" Supra, note 13.
"Mich. Pub. Acts, 1923, Act 285.
0 Section 7.
See provisions in the following statutes:
"Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918), sec. 2691, 2692, sec. 2, ch. 209,
Public Acts 1909; Iowa: Iowa Laws 1911, ch. 129, sec. 2, Iowa Laws 1913,
ch. 187, sec. 4, Iowa Laws 1915, ch. 202 sec. 4; New York: N. Y. Cons. Law
44 sec. 353; Michigan: Mich. Laws 1913, act 34, sec. 5; Kansas: Kan. Laws
1913, ch. 305, sec. 2, Kan. Laws 1917, ch. 299, sec. 7.
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Innumerable persons who for various reasons desire to put an
end to their procreative powers without affecting their emotional
life or their potency wonder from what it is that the Fourteenth
Amendment is invoked to protect the mentally incompetent, to whom
surely children are no blessing.
These considerations compel the conclusion that apart from
the underlying differences in point of view on the extent of the
police power, one who accepts the position of the Supreme Court
of the United States may still oppose on constitutional grounds a
statute which orders sterilization under conditions which serve no
practical purpose either to the individual involved or the state.
The answer to the objection that a statute which confines its
application to incompetents who *are committed to state institutions,
denies them the equal protection of the laws is stated by Mr. Justice
Holmes to be 6s
"that the law does all that is needed, when it does all that
it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines,
and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated
so far and so fast as its means allow. Of course so far as
the operations enable those who otherwise must be kept
confined to be returned to the world and thus open the
asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly
reached. (Italics ours.)
This is an answer only to such objection when directed to
the Virginia statute. It is not an answer when statutes like the
New Jersey law are involved.
It may be argued further that the classification of incompetents
into two subdivisions on the basis of whether they are within or
without state institutions is a legitimate classification from the point
of view of the purpose of the statutes. Incompetents who find their
way into state institutions in the main are those whose families can-
not or will not take care of them. This is the very class of incom-
petents that needs state protection most. It is this class, whose
members are permitted by those who by ties of relationship are
obligated to safeguard them from the danger of parenthood, to
indulge as opportunity presents itself and thus burden themselves
and the state with their progeny. The families of such incompe-
' Buck v. Bell, supra, note 13.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ASEXUALIZATION LECLSLATION 169
tents may be unwilling to protect them, or may be too poor to be.
able to do so. It makes no difference. Asexualization of such as
these, far from discriminating against them in favor of incompetents
more fortunately situated, really enables them to overcome the
handicap of their circumstances and places them more nearly on
the bases of equality with those whose families are willing and able
to exercise proper supervision over them. From that point of view
the equal protection clause of the constitution has no application. 4
DUE PROCESS
At this point due process of law becomes an important con-
sideration. As we have seen while asexualization is a benefit con-
ferred on an incompetent, it is an injury committed on one who
does not come under that classification, and an asexualization law
to be constitutional must provide a procedure which adequately
safeguards the individual against unjust and unwarranted enforce-
ment.
What constitutes due process of law is regulated and deter-
mined by the law of each state but it must have as its basis the prin-
ciple that the method of procedure adopted gives reasonable notice
and affords a fair opportunity to be heard before a decision is
made.6 5
There is no special point involved in the application of due
process to the sterilization of criminals as a punitive measure which
requires separate discussion from due process in its application to
mental defectives, as a eugenic measure. Both classes must be
given protection by a procedure adopted to the importance of the
right or liberty of which it is proposed to deprive the individual.
The power of procreation is certainly of primary importance
in life. In the case of Cline v. State Board of Eugenics,60 it was
"Cases of Haynes v. Williams, Osborne v. Thomson, followed the case
of Smith v. Board of Examiners, in toto holding that a statute limited in
its application to inmates of institutions denied such inmates the equal pro-
tection of the laws. This was also the holding of the Oregon Court in
State Boafd of Eugenics v. Cline, supra, note 14, on the first Oregon asexu-
alization law (Or. Laws (Olsen 1920) sec. 2887, 2898, Or. Laws 1919, ch. 264,
sec. 85-96).
-Hollinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314, 320 (1892) ; U. S. v Cruikshank, 92
U. S. 542 (1875) ; In re Kemmlbr, 136 U. S, 436, 448 (1890), Storti v. Mas-
sachusetts, 183 U. S. 138 (1901).
'Supra, note 64.
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held to be included in the term "life" as used in Sec. 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution, citing the decision in Mlunn Z'.
Illinois, 67 to the effect that
"The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all
those limbs and faculties byv which life is enjoyed. The
deprivation, not only of life, but of whatever God has given
to everyone with life, for its growth and enjoyment is pro-
hibited by the provision in question."
Reasoning from this construction the court held that the pro-
cedure adopted for the decision of the issue whether the proposed
subject of the operation comes within the provisions of the asexual-
ization statute, must provide for trial as formal as a criminal trial
for a capital crime.Gs
"Unquestionably," the court says. "this case belongs to
the class requiring strict rules of procedure for it is in the
class providing the direct consequences, namely: depriva-
tion of life. In such cases, the settled maxims of law
require the application of the rule of evidence demanding
at every stage of the proceeding, proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. The statute in question, however, beyond de-
claring that it is in any manner a punitive measure is
silent as to the rules of evidence applicable thereto. It is
true that there is a provision to the effect that after appeal
the trial shall be a trial de novo at law as provided by the
statutes of the state for the trial of actions at law; but it
nowhere indicates whether it shall be tried as a criminal
action or as a civil action."
The court further criticized the absence of provisions prescrib-
ing the method of joining the issues, the manner of forming the jury.
the number of peremptory challenges, the grounds for challenges
for cause, the number of concurring jurors necessary to warrant the
return of a verdict, and the absence of provision for complaint, in-
formation or indictment, motion, demurrer, answer or plea, or the
imposition of the.affirmative of the issue upon either party.
The provision that an informal notice of appeal filed with the
secretary of the board ordering the operation shall be all that is
necessary to make the appeal, impressed the Court as an indication
'94 U. S. 113, 142 (1876).
Supra, note 64 at 288.
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that the matter should be treated informally and without the safe-
guards demanded by the importance of the issue to be determined.
"Moreover," the court continued, 9 "the statute does not
state what court shall entertain an appeal * * . no
method is provided by statute for determining which one
[circuit court] is the appellate tribunal in these cases.
"We realize that if after due notice, before an impar-
tial judicial tribunal having competent jurisdiction is pro-
vided, even by way of appeal only, the constitutional guar-
anty is preserved, and that an appeal from the judgment
rendered after such trial, Aeed not be prescribed; but in a
case of such importance a this, every judicial impulse in-
clines to the wisdom of providing for such an appeal to
the highest court of this state." (Italics -Ours.)
This decision demands the extreme in procedure to constitute
due process of law in asexualization cases. As it admits, the Court
demands more than is strictly required by the generally accepted
definition of due process.
It is unquestionably true that the importance of the subject
involved warrants a procedure as ieticulously careful as a trial for
a capital crime but it need not be the same procedure. Due process
is not necessarily judicial process.. Any tribunal whether called a
court, commission or otherwise may be given by the legislature the
determination of a legal question.
70
The Virginia statute which was upheld by the Supreme Court
of the United States provides a procedure as scrupulously careful
as can be required, yet it does provide a jury trial, and the hearing
in the first instance is held before a board. But ample provision is
made for review by the courts and indeed the statute is exceptional
in its careful phrasing and intelligent regard for public feeling.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Buck v. Bell case
contains a summary of the law as follows: '
It recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterlization of
mental defectives, under careful safeguard, &c.; that the steriliza-
"Id.
Ex Parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1882); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S.
241 (1907) ; Murray v. Hoboken Land, etc., Co., 18 How. (U. S.) 272 (1855).
" Supra, note 13.
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tion may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by
salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life;
that the Commonwealth is supporting in various institutions many
defective persons who if now discharged would become a menace
but if incapable of procreating might be discharged with safety
and become self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to
society; and that experience has shown that heredity plays an
important part in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, &c. The
statute then enacts that whenever the superintendent of certain
institutions including the above named State Colony shall be of
opinion that it is for the best interest of the patients and of society
that an inmate under his care should be sexually sterilized, he
may have the operation performed upon any patient afflicted with
hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, &c., on complying with
the very careful provisions by which 'the act protects the patients
from possible abuse.
The superintendent first presents a petition to the special
board of directors of his hospital or colony, stating the facts and
the grounds for his opinion, verified by affidavit. Notice of the
petition and of the time and place of the hearing in the institution
is to be served upon the inmate, and also upon his guardian, and
if there is no guardian the superintendent is to apply to the
Circuit Court of the County to appoint one. If the inmate is a
minor notice also is to be given to his parents if any with a copy
of the petition. The board is to see to it that the inmate may
attend the hearings if desired by him or his guardian. The evi-
dence is all to be reduced to writing, and after the board has
made its order for or against the operation, the superintendent,
or the inmate, or his guardian, may appeal to the Circuit Court
of the County. The Circuit Court may consider the record of the
board and the evidence before it and such other admissible evi-
dence as may be offered, and may affirm, revise, or reverse the
order of -the board and enter such order as it deems just. Finally
any party may apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals, which, if
it grants the appeal, is to hear the case upon the record of the
trial in the Circuit Court and may enter such order as it thinks
the Circuit Court should have entered. As the court said:
"There can be no doubt that so far as procedure is
concerned the rights of the patient are most carefully con-
sidered, and as every step in this case was taken in
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scrupulous compliance with the statute and after months of
observation, there is no doubt that in that respect the
plaintiff in error has had due process of law."
The second Michigan statute 72 was as careful in providing
due process as that of Virginia. It requires ample notice of the
time and place of hearing by personal service not only on the
alleged defective but upon the prosecuting attorney of the country,
upon the relatives, father, mother, wife or child of the defective,
or upon the person with whom he resides, or at whose house he
may be, and in case no relative can be found service is required
upon a guardian at litem appointed by the court to receive such
notice and to represent the defective at the hearing. Regular
proceedings are followed and opportunities to defend with the
right of appeal are provided.
As the court said: 73
"Nothing further is required by the 'due process of
law' clause of the Constitution."
Neither the Iowa nor the Indiana statutes 74 made any pro-
vision for a hearing of any sort, much less for any appeal to
the courts. The Indiana court 75 followed the decision in Davis
v. Berry 76 in declaring the Indiana statute unconstitutional on the
ground that they denied the proposed subject due process of law.
SUMMARY
Two decades of experimentation and litigation have made it
possible to draw fairly definite conclusions of what is required of
a law authorizing or making mandatory the sterilization of the
socially unfit, to keep it within the provisions of the bill of rights
as included in the Federal and the various state constitutions.
First: Punitive sterilization is generally looked upon as con-
trary to civilized practice and as contravening the various constitu-
tional provisions against cruel and unusual punishments.
' Supra, note 61b.
' Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, supra, note 12 at 411.
"Supra., note 62.
" Supra, note 32.
' Supra, note 10.
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Second: Most courts have to date regarded a law for the
sterilization of incompetents, limiting its application to inmates of
state asylums, as denying such inmates the equal protection of the
laws, but the tendency is in the direction of upholding such a classi-
fication if combined with a policy which will bring into such
asylums similar incompetents and thus subject them to the opera-
tion of the law.
Third: It is absolutely essential that provision be made for a
hearing which will enable the proposed subject of sterilization to
contest the application of the law to him, whether that hearing be
before an administrative board or a judicial tribunal, and adequate
provision should be made for the review by appellate courts of the
decision on such hearing.
The spread of this type of legislation in the United States is
significant when we consider the fact that the popular mind does
not contemplate it with any degree of enthusiasm.
But in view of the fact that the inheritance of mental de-
fectiveness is no longer a theory, it is inevitable that the public
should ultimately acquiesce to the enactment and enforcement of
laws which will check the increase of the incompetent classes-
provided such laws adequately safeguard the members of such
classes from discrimination and abuse and provide a procedure so
careful in its fact-finding methods that ample protection is given
against the chance asexualization of persons who do properly belong
to them.
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